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MODERN POLICE PRACTICES: ARIZONA V GANTS




N 2009, law enforcement officers conducted more than 13.5
million searches without a warrant, consent, or exigent cir-
cumstances.1 Those searches were "incident to arrest," one of
the most commonly exercised exceptions 2 to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement.3 To conduct such a search,
the arresting officer need only make a legal arrest. The fact of
arrest itself justifies the search-the officer need not have any
additional suspicion that the arrestee is hiding a weapon, a
means of escape, or evidence of a crime.4 The scope of a search
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. A very special thank you to Alisa Stoughton, for her unflagging sup-
port, and Anne Coughlin, for her guidance and inspiration. Additional thanks go to
Josh Bowers, Darryl Brown, and Rachel Harmon, whose suggestions were invaluable.
I am also grateful for the editorial support of the Virginia Law Review.
'U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States
2009, Table 29: Estimated Number of Arrests (2010), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/
data/table_29.html (assuming at least one search incident to arrest was conducted for ar-
rests for every offense except those categorized under "Runaway" and "Suspicion").
2 Consensual searches are the only warrantless search more common than searches
incident to arrest. 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.2(b), at 68-69 (3d ed.
1996 & Supp. 2000); John M. MacDonald et al., Search and Seizure, in Criminal In-
vestigation of Drug Offenses 276 (1983); David E. Aaronson & Rangeley Wallace, A
Reconsideration of the Fourth Amendment's Doctrine of Search Incident to Arrest,
64 Geo. L.J. 53, 54 (1975) (stating that more than ninety percent of all searches receiv-
in court consideration were incident to an arrest).
. U.S. Const. amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.").
4 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969) (justifying searches incident to
arrest by the need to "seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault
an officer or effect an escape, [and] prevent the destruction of evidence" without any
discussion or requirement of officer knowledge or suspicion about the presence of
such items).
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incident to arrest extends to the person of an arrestee,5 the im-
mediate area where the arrest occurred6 and, until recently, the
passenger compartment of a vehicle recently occupied by the ar-
restee Modern courts, including the Supreme Court, have
adopted an almost mechanical recitation of the justifications for
the search incident to arrest doctrine that has led commentators
to note that courts view the doctrine as a "categorical entitle-
ment.'
Critics of vehicle searches incident to arrest have expressed
concern over the way the doctrine incentivizes pretextual stops
and arrests.9 Even before the Supreme Court granted certiorari
'United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) ("[A] full search of the [ar-
restee] is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment.").
6 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (1969) ("[T]he area into which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by" a rule
that allows officers to search for such items).
'Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 622 (2004) (making explicit that search
incident to arrest doctrine included arrests of recent vehicle occupants); New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (extending searches incident to arrest to the passen-
ger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle), overruled by Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct.
1710, 1726 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Although the Court refuses to acknowledge
that it is overruling Belton... there can be no doubt that it does so."). A vehicle's
passenger compartment is the contiguous space accessible to passengers in the vehicle
from the dashboard to the rear window. It includes the front and back seats (and
middle rows, if applicable), the glove box, and the rear storage area of SUVs. Engine
compartments and trunks that passengers cannot access while riding in the vehicle are
not considered "passenger compartments."
'Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Inci-
dent to Arrest, 19 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 381, 385 (2001); see also Robinson, 414 U.S. at
235 (holding that searches incident to lawful arrest "require[] no additional justifica-
tion").
'Scholars often cite the potential for abuse arising from the combination of Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-13 (1996) (permitting pretextual vehicle stops),
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 338-40 (2001) (permitting arrest upon
probable cause of any criminal violation, including traffic infractions, even when state
law does not authorize an arrest for the criminal violation), and Belton, 453 U.S. at
460-61 (permitting vehicle searches incident to the arrest of an occupant). Under this
line of cases, an officer who arrested any vehicle occupant for any offense-even a
pretextual arrest-was authorized to search the vehicle incident to arrest. See, e.g.,
David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway, 66
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 556, 567-68 (1998) (pre-dating Atwater, but expressing concern
for the potential for abuse).
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to Arizona v. Gant, scholars, ° legal activists," and the defense
bar 2 hoped the case would remove the incentive for pretextual ar-
rests by overruling New York v. Belton, which allowed officers to
search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to the ar-
rest of anyone in that vehicle. 3 The Gant decision was widely
viewed as vindicating those concerns,14 although academics have
not been alone in recognizing that the availability of alternative
justifications for post-arrest vehicle searches-such as inventory
and consent searches, vehicle "frisks," and searches justified under
the "automobile exception"-undermines Gant's impact on law en-
forcement/citizen interactions. 5
This Note has two principal purposes: one predictive, the other
descriptive. A number of commentators have suggested that Gant
will not constrain police because there are so many other search
justifications. In contrast, this Note predicts that Gant will not
meaningfully constrain police because the rule after Gant is
broader than scholars have yet realized. Existing academic com-
mentary erroneously assumes that Gant will limit vehicle searches
incident to arrest, but the two justifications that authorize vehicle
searches incident to arrest after Gant-evidence preservation and
officer safety-are both far more permissive than commentators
appreciate. For example, officers will continue to search vehicles
incident to arrest for many common offenses-particularly posses-
sion crimes and driving under the influence-because the very fact
of arrest gives officers reason to believe the vehicle contains evi-
0 See, e.g., Carson Emmons, Arizona v. Gant: An Argument for Tossing Belton and
All Its Bastard Kin, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 1067, 1069 (2004).
" See, e.g., Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 3-6,
Arizona v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640 (Ariz. 2007) (No. 02-1019).
2 See, e.g., Scott H. Greenfield, Car Searches: Supremes Take on Arizona v. Gant,
Simple Justice: A New York Criminal Defense Blog (Feb. 26, 2008, 7:24 AM),
http://blog.simplejustice.us/2008/02/26/car-searches-supremes-take-on-arizona-v-
grant.aspx.
3 453 U.S. at 460.
1
4 See, e.g., Scott Morgan, Supreme Court Upholds 4th Amendment in Arizona v.
Gant, Scott Morgan's Blog (Apr. 21, 2009), http://flexyourrights.org/gant-ruling.
" Barbara Armacost, Arizona v. Gant: Does it Matter?, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 275, 300-
01 (2010); Mark M. Neil, The Impact of Arizona v. Gant: Limiting the Scope of
Automobile Searches?, 18 Between the Lines 1, 2 (2009), available at
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/btl-vol 18_no_1-2009.pdf ("In short, the holding in Arizona
v. Gant is not an overly burdensome one on law enforcement.").
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dence, thereby triggering Gant's evidence preservation exception.
Indeed, Gant may only meaningfully constrain police when they
arrest a vehicle occupant on an outstanding warrant, and then only
if the arresting officer does not find any contraband on the arrestee
during a search of his person incident to arrest.
As a descriptive matter, mistaken assumptions about Gant's ef-
fects are not surprising given the dearth of information about law
enforcement practices in legal circles. When judges and academics
focus on whether a search is justified 6 or the scope of a permissible
search, 7 they do so in a vacuum, lacking critical information about
law enforcement arrest and search procedures. An arrest is more
than the means to initiate the criminal justice process. The ability
to search incident to an arrest has made it an evidence gathering
mechanism as well. Commentators cannot establish a cogent defi-
nition of arrest or address infringements on the liberty and privacy
interests at stake without understanding the context in which police
officers use that mechanism. This Note facilitates more thorough
academic discussion by providing detailed information about law
enforcement practices.
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I reviews the evolution of
the search incident to arrest doctrine and its application to vehicles
in Belton, which authorized law enforcement officers to search ve-
hicle passenger compartments after the arrest of a vehicle occu-
pant. It then discusses the facts and holding of Gant, which pur-
ported to restrict vehicle searches incident to arrest. Part I
identifies and resolves the ambiguity regarding the quantum of
proof needed to allow officers to search a vehicle incident to arrest
after Gant. It then predicts that Gant will do very little to constrain
vehicle searches incident to arrest in most cases. Part III seeks to
address why the Court's efforts to curtail vehicle searches incident
to arrest will fall flat, arguing that the overestimation of Gant's lim-
iting influence results primarily from a lack of information about
what law enforcement officers actually do. By describing common
law enforcement arrest and search procedures, Part III both illus-
trates Gant's limited effect and begins to address the surprising
,6 See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009); Logan, supra note 8, at 414-38.




dearth of scholarly work that discussed actual law enforcement
practices in more than a cursory or conceptual fashion.
1 8
I. EVOLUTION OF THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST DOCTRINE
A. The Origins of the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine
Officers have been taught to search arrestees for weapons for
over two hundred years,'9 but it was not until 1848, while rendering
an opinion in an otherwise unremarkable trover case, that the Su-
preme Court of Vermont ushered the search incident to arrest doc-
trine from police ° procedure texts to American legal reporters.
The court justified the ability of an officer to search an arrestee by
holding that an individual who violated the law surrendered his
right to be protected from an otherwise illegal search.2' Within two
decades, other courts had embraced the doctrine but not the justi-
fication for it. In holding a police officer not liable for civil trespass,
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire abandoned Vermont's vari-
ant of the "clean hands" doctrine22 and immunized the officer from
liability when his search was based on his good faith "regard [for]
his own or the public safety, or the security of his prisoner."23
The United States Supreme Court first voiced its approval of the
doctrine in Weeks v. United States, a 1914 Fourth Amendment case
that noted in dicta the government's right, "always recognized un-
,8For an exception to this general rule, see Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a
Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 657,
663-68, in which Professor Moskovitz discusses the limited responses to his requests
for information about policies and procedures governing arrests and searches, which
he sent to over one hundred local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.
19 Logan, supra note 8, at 386 n.29 (citing Conductor Generalis 109, 117 (James
Parker ed., New York 1788)).
20 This Note uses "police" as shorthand for the far broader term "law enforcement."
21 Spalding v. Preston, 21 Vt. 9, 15-16 (1848) ("One who sets himself deliberately at
work to contravene the fundamental laws of civil governments, that is, the security of
life, liberty, or property, forfeits his own right to protection, in those respects, wherein
he was studying to infringe the rights of others.").
22 See Black's Law Dictionary 268 (8th ed. 2004).
23 Closson v. Morrison, 47 N.H. 482, 484-85 (1867) (finding that an officer would be
justified in taking from a prisoner any deadly weapon, money, or articles of value by
which a prisoner might "procure his escape, or obtain tools, or implements, or weap-
ons with which to effect his escape," regardless of the crime for which the person was
arrested or whether the prisoner made any threats of violence toward the arresting
officer).
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der English and American law, to search the person of the accused
when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences
of crime."" Eleven years later, in a case that had, at best, a tangen-
tial relationship to the search incident to arrest doctrine, the Su-
preme Court again endorsed the doctrine and its evidence-
gathering justification, stating, "When a man is legally arrested for
an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control
which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to
prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prose-
cution."" Although originally limited in both the Supreme Court
and lower courts to evidence material to the charge for which the
defendant was arrested," Prohibition-era courts expanded the doc-
trine to allow for the introduction into evidence of liquor seized
during searches incident to non-alcohol related arrests. The Su-
preme Court continued to expand the doctrine even after Prohibi-
tion, holding in Harris v. United States28 and United States v. Rabi-
nowitz29 that the government's right to search incident to arrest
extended to all "premises ... under the control of the person ar-
rested and where the crime was being committed."3 In both cases,
the Court cited its earlier precedent holding that the search inci-
dent to arrest doctrine was justified by the need to locate "things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it
was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an es-
cape from custody."31
2 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
' Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925); accord Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
" See, e.g., 32 A.L.R. 680, 687 (1924) (citing a number of state, federal, and English
cases for, inter alia, "[tihe proposition that an officer who lawfully arrests an offender
without a warrant may search for, and seize, and take into custody, the subject of the
crime, or the thing or instrument by which it was committed, or which might aid the
prisoner in escaping, but has no authority to search for and take from the prisoner any
other property").
27See Logan, supra note 8, at 390 n.49.
331 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1947).
29339 U.S. 56, 61 (1950).
'0 Id. at 61. But see id. at 64 (noting that the room "was small and under the imme-
diate and complete control of [the defendant]" and "the search did not extend beyond
the room used for unlawful purposes").
" Id. at 77 (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925)); Harris, 331
U.S. at 151 (same).
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The Supreme Court cut back on the scope of searches incident
to arrest in Chimel v. California.32 In Chimel, officers arrested an
individual at his house and, after the arrestee refused to consent to
a search of his home, searched "the entire three-bedroom house,
including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop" incident to
the arrest.3 When it held that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment, the Court recited the foundational principle of war-
rantless search doctrine: the justification of a warrantless search
determines its scope?' A search incident to arrest, held the Court,
was justified under the dual rationales of officer safety and evi-
dence gathering: it was reasonable for officers to remove any weap-
ons with which the arrestee could "resist arrest or effect his es-
cape," as well as seize any evidence to prevent its concealment or
destruction.35 These rationales made it reasonable for officers to
conduct "a search [incident to arrest] of the arrestee's person and
the area within his immediate control."36 However, the Court held
that there was no similar justification for searching rooms other
than where the arrest was conducted, or even for searching the
"desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room it-
self."37
After Chimel, searches incident to arrest were governed by a
maddening amalgam of a bright-line rule and an ill-defined stan-
dard based on the facts of each case. Courts were given clear in-
structions that the very fact of a valid arrest justified a search of the
arrestee and the area in the arrestee's immediate control, but at the
same time courts were told that determining the scope of the
search incident to arrest required defining the exact size of the
searchable area on a case-by-case basis, a definition that could vary
dramatically based on the circumstances.3"
32 395 U.S. 752,753-55, 768 (1969).
3 Id. at 754.
4 Id. at 762-65.
35Id. at 762-63.
36 Id. at 763 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37 Id.
"8 Id. at 762-64.
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B. Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest and New York v. Belton
As lower courts wrestled to determine what constituted the area
of immediate control in the context of vehicle searches incident to
arrest, they inevitably came to inconsistent conclusions. The U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits upheld
not only the search of vehicle passenger compartments, but also
the search of containers in a vehicle searched incident to the arrest
of a vehicle occupant.39 The Fifth Circuit permitted officers to
search an attach6 case that had been sitting in the back seat of the
suspect's car when he was arrested "at his car."' The court cited
Chimel for the proposition that a search incident to arrest extended
to the area within the arrestee's immediate control and found that
both the vehicle and the attach6 case had been within the arrestee's
immediate control.41 Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits admitted
into evidence heroin that officers found inside opaque packages in
vehicles searched incident to arrest.
Yet the Fifth and Eighth Circuits both contradicted themselves,
holding in other cases that evidence seized pursuant to searches of
opaque containers located in vehicles searched incident to arrest
were impermissible in the absence of a search warrant.43 In United
States v. Rigales, an officer stopped a vehicle for illegally crossing a
dirt median." During the stop, the officer arrested one of the pas-
sengers on outstanding warrants and, during a search of the vehicle
incident to arrest, found a firearm inside a zippered leather case.5
The Fifth Circuit overruled the trial court and held that the search
and seizure was unconstitutional without discussing existing circuit
precedent to the contrary.46
New York v. Belton was the Supreme Court's attempt to con-
front the inconsistency in the scope of vehicle searches incident to
39United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 668-70 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919,
922 (9th Cir. 1977).
40 Frick, 490 F.2d at 668.
41 Id. at 669.
4
1 Sanders, 631 F.2d at 1313; Dixon, 558 F.2d at 922.43 United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364, 366 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ben-
son, 631 F.2d 1336, 1337-38 (8th Cir. 1980).
44 Rigales, 630 F.2d at 366.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 366-68.
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arrest. 7 Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart acknowledged
"[t]he difficulty courts have had... decid[ing] whether, in the
course of a search incident to the lawful custodial arrest of the oc-
cupants of an automobile, police may search inside the automobile
after the arrestees are no longer in it."48
The basic facts leading to the vehicle search incident to arrest in
Belton were not in any sense unusual. A New York State Trooper
stopped a vehicle for speeding. 9 After smelling "burnt marihuana"
and observing an envelope he identified as drug paraphernalia on
the floor of the car," the trooper directed the four male occupants
to exit the vehicle and arrested them.' The officer "patted down
each of the men and split them up into four separate areas of the
[road] ... so they would not be in physical touching area of each
other."52 The Supreme Court opinion does not mention whether
the trooper handcuffed any of the arrestees, but the dissent noted
that the trooper did not secure any of the men in his patrol car. 3
The trooper then retrieved the envelope from the car and found
that it contained marijuana. 4 The trooper provided the arrestees
with Miranda warnings, searched them, and searched the vehicle's
passenger compartment. When he found cocaine in a zippered
pocket of a leather jacket on the back seat of the car, the trooper
secured the jacket, put all four arrestees in his vehicle and drove
them to a police station for booking. 6
A majority of the New York Court of Appeals held that neither
of the dual rationales justifying a search incident to arrest-officer
,7 453 U.S. 454, 455-57 (1981).
48Id. at 459.
4 Id. at 455-56.
'0 Id. (noting that the officer recognized that the word written on the envelope, "Su-
pergold," referred to cannabis).
" Id. at 456. There is some dispute in the opinion about exactly when the custodial
arrest occurred. The dissent states that the custodial arrest did not occur until after
the trooper removed the men from the vehicle, patted them down, and separated
them. Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5I Id. at 456 (majority opinion).
Id. at 468 ("Under the approach taken today, the result would presumably be the
same even if Officer Nicot had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol
car .... ) (Brennan, J., dissenting).





safety and evidence preservation-applies "where there is no
longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate might gain ac-
cess to the article."57 The dissent agreed with the majority about the
justifications for searches incident to arrest58 but argued that, under
the circumstances, there was a danger that one of the arrestees
could have gotten hold of the jacket and the destructible evidence
therein, rendering the search permissible for evidence preservation
reasons.
59
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because "courts have dis-
covered the [justifications for searches incident to arrest are] diffi-
cult to apply in specific cases."' The Court thought a bright-line
rule appropriate because "[a] highly sophisticated set of rules,
qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts ... may be 'literally im-
possible [to apply] by the officer in the field."'61 The Supreme
Court was confident that citizens need to know the extent of their
constitutional protections and that police officers need to know the
constitutional scope of their authority.62 The Court then fashioned
a clear rule allowing police to search a vehicle incident to the arrest
of an occupant based on an irrebuttable presumption-and legal
fiction-that the passenger compartment of a vehicle is always
within an arrestee's grabbing range,63 holding:
[A]rticles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger
compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not
inevitably, within "the area into which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]." In order to estab-
lish the workable rule this category of cases requires, we read
People v. Belton, 407 N.E.2d 420, 421 (N.Y. 1981).
58 Id. at 423.
Id. at 424 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting) ("The situation was still fluid, and neither the
suspects themselves nor their property had as yet been reduced to the exclusive and
certain control of the police.").
Belton, 453 U.S. at 458.
6, Id. (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standard-
ized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127, 141).
62 Id. at 459-60.
631d. The Supreme Court later expanded the Belton doctrine to allow for vehicle
searches incident to arrest even when the arresting officer does not make contact with
the arrestee until after the arrestee has exited his vehicle. Thornton v. United States,
541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004).
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Chimel's definition of the limits of the area that may be searched
in light of that generalization. 6'
Writing in dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the majority for de-
liberately ignoring Chimel's "temporal and. .. spatial limitation on
searches incident to arrest."65 Justice Brennan wrote, "When the
arrest has been consummated and the arrestee safely taken into
custody, the justifications underlying Chimel's limited exception to
the warrant requirement cease to apply: at that point there is no
possibility that the arrestee could reach weapons or contraband."'
To maintain the limits Chimel envisioned, Justice Brennan advo-
cated for case-by-case determinations in which courts would review
various factors to determine whether a particular area was within
the arrestee's immediate control.67
C. Arizona v. Gant
Like those in Belton, the facts leading to the arrest of Rodney
Gant are not uncommon for law enforcement officers. When two
officers responding to an anonymous tip about drug trafficking at a
residence knocked on the front door, Gant answered even though
he was not a resident there.' Once they left the residence, the offi-
cers "conducted a records check" and learned that there was an
outstanding warrant for Gant's arrest, and that Gant's driver's li-
cense was still suspended.69 The officers returned to the house later
that evening and, after arresting two people for unrelated crimes,
observed Gant as he drove his car into the driveway." As Gant ex-
ited his vehicle, an officer "called to" and approached him, meeting
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
" Id. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 465-66.
67 Id. at 471 (including "the relative number of police officers and arrestees, the
manner of restraint placed on the arrestee, and the ability of the arrestee to gain ac-
cess to a particular area or container").
68 Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714-15 (2009).
69 Id. at 1715. Police officers routinely conduct records checks on anyone they inter-
act with, including witnesses and crime victims.
0 Id. The opinion states that the officers "recognized [Gant's] car," although there is
no mention of whether they observed his car during their previous visit or whether




Gant ten to twelve feet from Gant's car where he "immediately ar-
rested Gant and handcuffed him., 7' Because their vehicles were oc-
cupied by the other arrestees, the officers called for assistance and
waited until two other officers arrived, then secured Gant in the
backseat of one of the newly arrived officers' vehicles.72 Two offi-
cers then searched Gant's car. 3 One found a firearm, while the
other found "a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the
backseat. ""
Gant moved to suppress the firearm and cocaine on Fourth
Amendment grounds.75 The trial court denied Gant's motion to
suppress, but the state appellate court reversed. 6 The Arizona Su-
preme Court ultimately affirmed, holding Belton inapplicable. 7
Belton, in the view of the Arizona Supreme Court, addressed the
scope of a search but not the threshold question of whether a
search was authorized. Because neither of Chimel's dual ration-
ales was satisfied, officers were not allowed to search Gant's vehi-
cle.79
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, intoning that "courts,
scholars, and Members of this Court" had all questioned Belton's
"clarity and its fidelity to Fourth Amendment principles."8 The
Court first rejected the narrow reading of Belton, noting that Bel-
ton "has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident
to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the
arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search."'"
The Supreme Court went on to repudiate Belton's adoption of such
a broad rule, criticizing it for detaching vehicle searches incident to
arrest from the justifications described in Chimel.' The Belton rule
71 Id. The Arizona Supreme Court opinion has a slightly different description of the
facts, reciting that Gant was arrested and handcuffed "eight to twelve feet" from his
car. State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 641 (Ariz. 2007).
72 Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1715.
" Id.
74 Id.
71 State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 641, 642 n.1 (Ariz. 2007).
State v. Gant, 43 P.3d 188, 194 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
Gant, 162 P.3d at 643.
78 Id.
79 Id.





was, the Court stated, "clearly incompatible" with the "statement
in Belton that it 'in no way alter[ed] the fundamental principles es-
tablished in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches
incident to lawful custodial arrests."'' 3 Nor was such a broad rule
required to "protect law enforcement safety and evidentiary inter-
ests" because existing exceptions to the warrant requirement en-
sure officers' ability to "search a vehicle when genuine safety or
evidentiary concerns... justify a [warrantless] search."" The Su-
preme Court overturned Belton, describing its generalization that
the passenger compartment of a vehicle is frequently within reach-
ing distance of an arrestee as "unfounded" and "faulty., 85 "Blind
adherence to Belton[]," the Court wrote, "would authorize myriad
unconstitutional searches."86
The Supreme Court, however, did not totally eliminate the au-
thority of law enforcement officers to conduct vehicle searches in-
cident to arrest. Instead, the Gant decision permitted vehicle
searches incident to the arrest of a recent occupant in two contexts:
first, when the arrestee is "unsecured and within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search," and sec-
ond, "when... it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evi-
dence of the offense of arrest."'87 Regrettably, the Court did not
provide any direction to law enforcement officers on how they
should define "reasonable belief,"' "unsecured," or "reaching dis-
tance." 9
Id. (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 (1981)).
Id. at 1721 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (permitting an of-
ficer to search a vehicle's passenger compartment when he has reasonable suspicion
that an individual on scene is dangerous and might access the vehicle to gain immedi-
ate control of a weapon), and United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982)
(permitting a warrantless search of any part of a vehicle, including containers within
the vehicle, if officers have probable cause to believe evidence might be located
there)).
8 Id. at 1723. Ironically, the Supreme Court made factual assumptions in both Bel-
ton and Gant-whether the passenger compartment of a vehicle is within an arrestee's
grabbing distance-without citation or support. See id.; Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-60.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723.
Id. at 1719, 1721. Oddly, despite the majority's reliance on the Chimel rationales
to overturn Belton, the Supreme Court describes its second holding as "not fol-
low[ing] from Chimel." Id. at 1719.
See infra Section II.A.
89 See infra Subsection II.B.3.
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Justice Scalia joined the majority with emphatic reluctance.' In a
concurring opinion, he stated that the majority opinion "fail[ed] to
provide the needed guidance to arresting officers" and incentivized
law enforcement to leave the scene unsecured.' He thought the
majority's rationale would induce officers to artificially create dan-
gerous situations by not handcuffing arrestees or securing them in
the back of a police car so as to justify a vehicle search incident to
arrest under Gant's officer safety rationale. Justice Scalia advo-
cated abandoning what he described as the "charade of officer
safety" and replacing it with a rule permitting vehicle searches in-
cident to arrest "only when the object of the search is evidence of
the crime for which the arrest was made, or of another crime that
the officer has probable cause to believe occurred."' However,
Justice Scalia recognized that he was the lone voice for that posi-
tion, and he joined the majority because he felt it would have been
"unacceptable ... for the Court to come forth with a 4-to-1-to-4
opinion that [left] the governing rule uncertain."93
II. GANT'S EFFECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES
The Supreme Court's holding in Gant authorizes vehicle
searches incident to arrest when it is "reasonable to believe that
evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle" and
when the vehicle is "within an [unsecured] arrestee's immediate
control, meaning the area from which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence."' This Part addresses two unre-
solved questions about Gant: First, what quantum of proof is re-
quired to satisfy the "reasonable [belief]" standard? Second, to
what extent will Gant restrict vehicle searches incident to arrest?
" Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1725 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing his joining the majority
as the lesser of two evils).
91 Id. at 1724.
Id. at 1725.
Id.
94Id. at 1714 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A. Identifying the Quantum of Proof for Evidentiary Searches after
Gant
Commentators have criticized Gant's "reasonable belief" stan-
dard for not conforming clearly to the two traditional Fourth
Amendment quanta of proof-reasonable suspicion and probable
cause95 -and lower courts have exhibited some confusion about
this portion of the Gant holding.' This Section argues that "rea-
sonable belief" should be interpreted as "reasonable suspicion" for
two reasons. First, courts and scholars have consistently read "rea-
sonable belief" to mean "reasonable suspicion" since Terry v.
Ohio. Second, interpreting the Gant standard as "probable cause"
would render a large portion of the Gant holding superfluous in
light of the existing "automobile exception." This Section expands
on each argument in turn.
1. "Reasonable Belief" is Reasonable Suspicion
Courts and commentators have historically understood "reason-
able belief" as synonymous with "reasonable suspicion," and Gant
should be read to adopt, not challenge, that well-established read-
ing. The reasonable suspicion standard originated more than forty
years ago in Terry v. Ohio, which continues to stand for the dual
propositions that a law enforcement officer may temporarily stop
an individual whom he reasonably suspects of being involved in
criminal activity (a Terry stop), and that he may conduct a protec-
tive pat-down search if he reasonably suspects that the individual
may be armed (a Terry frisk).' But the "reasonable suspicion"
95Armacost, supra note 15, at 280-81; Angad Singh, Comment, Stepping Out of the
Vehicle: The Potential of Arizona v. Gant to End Automatic Searches Incident to Ar-
rest Beyond the Vehicular Context, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 1759, 1773 (2010).
Compare United States v. Howard, 621 F.3d. 433, 455 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Gant
for the proposition that an automobile search is sustainable "[i]f there is probable
cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity"), with United States
v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that "the 'reasonable to believe'
standard probably is akin to the 'reasonable suspicion' standard required to justify
a Terry search").
" 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). For an example of how lower courts have interpreted
this standard, see, for example, Vinton, which refers to the "reasonable suspicion
standard required to justify a Terry search." 594 F.3d at 25 (internal citations and quo-
tation marks omitted).
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standard read into Terry98 does not appear in the plain language of
the opinion; throughout his decision, Chief Justice Warren articu-
lated the standard as a "reason to believe."" The words "suspi-
cion," "suspicious," and "suspect" are used to describe the circum-
stances and the defendant's behavior, not as referents to the
quantum of proof officers need to justify a stop or frisk."u The
Court explicitly noted that reasonable belief is something less than
probable cause, holding it is reasonable for an officer to frisk
someone he "has reason to believe [is] ... armed and danger-
ous. . regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime."''
When the Court extended the Terry frisk to vehicles in Michigan
v. Long," lower courts understood that officers could "frisk" a ve-
hicle only if they had reasonable suspicion that the vehicle con-
tained a weapon. 3 Yet in Long, as in Terry, the standard actually
articulated by the Court was "reasonable belief."1" Writing for the
Court, Justice O'Connor merged the terms by rooting Long in "the
principles articulated in Terry," under which officers may search
for weapons when they have "an articulable suspicion that an indi-
vidual is armed and dangerous."'' 5 Similarly, Justice Brennan re-
9 See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 185
(2004) ("Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, the Court has recognized.., reasonable suspi-
cion" as the quantum of proof that justifies an investigatory detention) (internal cita-
tions omitted); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1055 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Terry, and the cases that followed it, permit only brief investigative stops and ex-
tremely limited searches based on reasonable suspicion." (internal quotation marks
omitted); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700 (1983) (discussing the Terry stan-
dard as "reasonable suspicion")); Angela Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U.
Miami L. Rev. 425, 428 (1997); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion:
When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind. L.J. 659, 659-60 (1994).
But see Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 St.
John's L. Rev. 911, 926 (1998) ("Notwithstanding the fact that Terry is widely known
today as a reasonable suspicion case and as establishing a reasonable suspicion stan-
dard, one can find nothing in Chief Justice Warren's opinion to support the claim that
he thought that was the standard the Court was adopting.").
99 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
0'Id. at 8, 24-28. They are, however, used to refer to the quantum of proof in the
portion of the opinion where the Court summarizes the State's argument. Id. at 10-11.
101 Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
10 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
103 See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin-Bey, 584 F.3d 1117, 1120 (8th Cir. 2009).
"4463 U.S. at 1049-50.
105 Id. at 1034-35 (emphasis added).
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ferred to the majority's "reasonable belief" standard as "reason-
able suspicion" throughout his dissent.'
The Court again applied the "reasonable belief" standard in the
Fourth Amendment context in Maryland v. Buie."7 In Buie, officers
serving an arrest warrant for robbery called the defendant out of
his basement, arrested him, then searched the basement "in case
there was someone else down there" and discovered evidence used
to win a conviction." In denying the defendant's attempt to sup-
press the evidence, the Court held that officers may search areas
that are outside the scope of a Chimel search if they have a "rea-
sonable belief based on specific and articulable facts" that the other
rooms contain "an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene."1 9 But it was so clear that the "reasonable belief" standard
in Buie equated to "reasonable suspicion" that Justice Stevens
opened his concurrence by writing, "Today the Court holds that
reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, is necessary to
support a protective sweep while an arrest is in progress. ' ' 10
One contention that reasonable belief and reasonable suspicion
should not be read synonymously is the proposition that the Su-
preme Court has established a "general rule that reasonable suspi-
cion can only support limited searches for officer safety."' 1 Under
this argument, the phrase "reasonable belief" has two definitions.
When a search is motivated by officer safety concerns, "reasonable
belief" is synonymous with reasonable suspicion. In other contexts,
however, such as evidentiary searches, "reasonable belief" takes on
a different meaning with a higher quantum of proof.
This dual-meaning theory rests on a faulty premise; the "reason-
able suspicion" standard has not been limited to searches moti-
vated by officer safety concerns. In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme
Court held it reasonable for law enforcement officers to detain-
not search-an individual to promote the "general interest.., of
effective crime prevention and detection" without implicating offi-
SId. at 1054-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
494 U.S. 325 (1990).
Id. at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted).
''Id. at 334, 337 (emphasis added).
"o Id. at 337 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
.. See Singh, supra note 95, at 1774 (emphasis added).
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cer safety."2 Officers may detain individuals when they have a rea-
sonable suspicion "criminal activity may be afoot," 113 but the sus-
pected criminal activity need not be violent or dangerous. Courts
permit Terry stops for traffic infractions,"' drug investigations,'
and even when an officer can articulate suspicious circumstances
without a specific crime in mind."6
2. "Reasonable Belief" is not Probable Cause
There are additional and independent reasons to reject reading
Gant's "reasonable belief" standard to mean "probable cause."
However desirable such an interpretation may be as a normative
matter, existing precedent would render it superfluous. The
"automobile exception" permits police officers to search vehicles if
they have probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in
the vehicle regardless of whether they arrest a vehicle occupant."7
As the D.C. Circuit held, "[T]he 'reasonable to believe' standard
requires less than probable cause, because otherwise Gant's evi-
dentiary rationale would merely duplicate the 'automobile excep-
tion,' which the Court specifically identified as a distinct exception
to the warrant requirement."'' 8 Because of the inherent exigency
with which the Court believes vehicles must be treated, law en-
forcement officers with probable cause to believe that a vehicle
contains evidence of a crime have been allowed to conduct war-
rantless vehicle searches since 1925, regardless of whether they
have arrested a recent occupant of the vehicle."9 The Gant decision
neither disrupted that precedent nor limited vehicle searches to
situations in which the officers had probable cause.2' Instead, the
Court discussed the "reasonable belief" standard as existing in ad-
112 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
... Id. at 30.
11 See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 784 (2009).
"' See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 368-69 (1993).
116 See, e.g., New York v. Earl, 431 U.S. 943, 943-44 (1977).
H7 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
" United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
,, See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
20 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (discussing and reaffirming the precedent set by Car-
roll).
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dition to other vehicle search doctrines. 12' Rather than merely echo
established precedent, the Gant Court intended to supplement that
precedent by reducing the quantum of proof necessary to search a
vehicle for evidence when that search is incident to arrest.
B. Gant's Illusory Effect on Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest
The expectation among commentators has been that Gant
would not change what police do-search vehicles-but it would
change how police justified those searches by significantly con-
straining vehicle searches incident to arrest, and it would reduce
the incentive for officers to make arrests for traffic offenses by
eliminating vehicle searches incident to those arrests. This Part
argues that such an expectation is misplaced: Gant will not sig-
nificantly constrain vehicle searches incident to arrest, and
therefore its effect on police behavior is largely illusory. Gant
will not substantially decrease the number of pretextual arrests
for traffic violations for the simple reason that relatively few
such arrests occurred even before Gant. Further, Gant's dual
justifications for vehicle searches incident to arrest-evidence
preservation and officer safety-are far more permissive than
they first appear, based on both the nature of the offenses for
which most vehicle occupants are arrested-possession crimes
and DUI-and the circumstances surrounding common arrest
scenarios. Officers do not need to change how they justify vehi-
cle searches because Gant left their authority to search incident
to arrest largely intact.
121 Id. at 1723-24.
'22 Compare Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723-24 ("Police may search a vehicle incident to a
recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passen-
ger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle
contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a
search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or
show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies."), with Acevedo, 500
U.S. at 579 ("[T]he police may search [a vehicle] without a warrant if their search is
supported by probable cause.").
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1. Arrests for Traffic Infractions
Under the precedent established by Whren v. United States,"
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,"' and New York v. Belton,'25 an of-
ficer who lacked a legal justification for searching a car needed
only follow his target until he observed the driver commit a traffic
offense. The officer could then pull the vehicle over (Whren), ar-
rest the driver for the traffic infraction (Atwater), and get a "free"
search of the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest (Belton).'26 In
this context, Gant's preclusion of vehicle searches was widely ex-
pected to be a significant limitation on law enforcement. '27 While
any reduction of the potential for abuse of the
WhrenlAtwaterlBelton precedent is well warranted,'28 empirical
analysis suggests that arrests for traffic infractions were uncommon
even before Gant. Gant's effect, then, is blunted; while it will pre-
clude searches incident to arrests for traffic violations, there have
simply never been many such arrests.
As a preliminary matter, jurisdictions categorize traffic offenses
differently. Some states categorize traffic offenses as civil infrac-
tions rather than criminal violations, 29 so officers cannot make ar-
rests for traffic infractions even after Atwater. Other states classify
traffic offenses as criminal infractions. "' Even where officers can
make arrests for traffic violations, however, statistics suggest they
do not often do so. According to the most recent research survey
by the Bureau of Justice Statistics ("BJS"), law enforcement offi-
cers conducted about 17.4 million traffic stops in 2005.' Police re-
123 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
124 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
12' 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
16 Id.
12' See supra note 9; see also Craig M. Bradley, Two and a Half Cheers for the
Court, Trial, Aug. 2009, at 38, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431562.
'" See, e.g., David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving
While Black" Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265,277-88 (2000).
129 See. e.g., Fla. Stat. § 318.12 (2010) (generally decriminalizing traffic violations and
rendering them civil infractions); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-121 (2004) (identifying
traffic violations in certain chapters as misdemeanors, while treating traffic violations
in other chapters as civil infractions).
130 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 40-6-1(a) (2007) (LexisNexis) (identifying traffic viola-
tions generally as misdemeanors).
131 Matthew R. Durose et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contacts between Police and the
Public, 2005, at 5 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf
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solved only 2.4% of those stops by arresting the driver of the
stopped vehicle, reflecting approximately 418,600 arrests. Of those
arrests, more than a third resulted from a DUI roadblock or non-
traffic offense, as depicted in the table.
Traffic-Related Arrests, Based on 17.444.000 Traffic Stops 32
Traffic Stops Resolved by Arrest
Approximate Approximate
Percent Number Percent Number
Traffic Infractions
Speeding 53.3% 9,297,652 1.1%. 102,274
Vehicle Defect 9.6% 1,674,624 3.5% 58,612
Record Check 10.7% 1,866,508 1.9%* 35,464
Seatbelt 4.7% 819,868 <0.5% <4,099
Illegal Turn or
Lane Change 5.7% 994,308 1.9%* 18,892
Stop Sign/Light
Violation 7.2% 1,255,968 2.0%* 25,119
Other Traffic
Offense 2.6% 453,544 7.3%* 33,109
Sub-Total 93.8% 16,362,472 -277,569
Other*** 3.9% 680,316 7.1%* 48,302
Roadside Drunk
Driving Check 2.2% 383,768 16.4% 62,938
Total** 100.00% 17,444,000 -418,656
*Estimate based on 10 or fewer samples.
**Details may not add up to total because of rounding.
***"Other" is not defined but appears to exclude traffic offenses.
(excluding approximately 356,000 traffic stops, or 2% of the total 17.8 million, in which the
driver reported the officer did not give a reason for the stop).
132 Id. at 4-5 (with extrapolated calculations). The precise usage of the term "arrest"
is unclear, as the drivers self-reported that description. It may include a number of
false positives, such as detention in handcuffs without a search incident to arrest and
''paper arrests," in which a driver is issued a citation for a criminal infraction and must
appear in court even without being physically arrested and searched. It may also con-
tain false negatives, as when an officer arrests and then "unarrests" an individual and
the individual does not report that interaction as an arrest.
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Not only are arrests for traffic violations uncommon when com-
pared to the number of traffic stops and arrests every year, they are
also rare compared to the number of law enforcement officers. If
all 777,885 full- and part-time state and local police officers em-
ployed as of September 2004133 divided the traffic stops and arrests
for traffic offenses equally between themselves, each officer would
make about 23 traffic stops. Only one officer in three would make
an arrest for a traffic violation over the course of the year. To the
extent that the abuse of Whren and Atwater was more limited than
scholars realized, Gant will have a minimal effect on changing po-
lice conduct.
Further, police who do arrest a vehicle occupant for a traffic in-
fraction (or for any other offense, for that matter) retain the au-
thority to conduct a search of the arrestee's person incident to ar-
rest. This is a particularly thorough search, intended to find
evidence and anything that may present a threat.'34 If they locate
incriminating evidence on the arrestee, officers can then use that
evidence to justify a vehicle search incident to arrest under Gant's
evidence preservation rationale, as the next Section demonstrates.
2. Evidentiary Searches Incident to Arrest
Gant was criticized for its lack of clarity about whether law en-
forcement officers will always need to identify facts beyond the ar-
rest itself to articulate reasonable suspicion or whether the nature
of the crime for which the arrest was made can, without more, give
an officer reasonable suspicion to conduct an evidentiary vehicle
search incident to arrest.135 This Note argues that many-if not
most-vehicle occupants are arrested for crimes for which the fact
of arrest itself establishes reasonable suspicion. Moreover, for
other crimes, officers will often develop reasonable suspicion based
on factual circumstances that commonly accompany the arrest of a
vehicle occupant.
" Brian A. Reaves, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Census of State and Local Law Enforce-
ment Agencies, 2004, at 2 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
csllea04.pdf (reflecting 731,903 full-time and 45,982 part-time law enforcement offi-
cers nationwide).
'- See infra Section III.B.
'35 See Armacost, supra note 15, at 306-07.
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In Gant, the Supreme Court explicitly identified two categories
of offenses and implicitly recognized a third. The first category
consists of crimes for which "there will be no reasonable basis to
believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence" of the crime of ar-
rest, such as "traffic violation[s].'" The nature of the offenses in
this category effectively precludes the application of Gant's evi-
dence preservation rationale because there simply cannot be any
evidence in the vehicle. Relatively few vehicle occupants are ar-
rested for crimes that fall into the first category, particularly traffic
offenses."'3
The second category includes crimes for which "the offense of
arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment
of an arrestee's vehicle and any containers therein."'38 The fact that
a vehicle occupant was arrested for an offense in this category in-
evitably satisfies Gant's evidence preservation rationale, paralleling
the way that vehicle searches incident to arrest were automatic un-
der Belton. Although precise statistics are unavailable, this Note
argues that the majority of arrests of vehicle occupants are for
crimes within this category.
The third category, which fills the gap between the first two,
consists of offenses for which an arrest is irrelevant. For these of-
fenses, circumstances other than the fact of arrest dictate whether
the officer who makes the arrest will be able to articulate reason-
able suspicion. Common factual situations surrounding the arrest
of vehicle occupants will often, but not inevitably, provide officers
with reasonable suspicion that there is evidence of the crime of ar-
rest in the vehicle.
a. Offenses for Which an Arrest Establishes Reasonable Suspicion
The Gant opinion provides that arrests for some offenses will
automatically justify a search incident to arrest because "the of-
fense of arrest... suppl[ies the] basis for searching" the vehicle.'39
To illustrate this principle, the Supreme Court referred to the facts
of two cases: Belton and Thornton.' The context of the Supreme
"6 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009).
,7 See supra Subsection II.B.1.




1750 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:1727
Court's illustration makes clear that it is the offense itself that mat-
ters: Roger Belton and Marcus Thornton were both arrested for
drug crimes.' In distinguishing Gant from the two prior cases, the
Supreme Court wrote, "An evidentiary basis for the search was
also lacking in [Gant]. Whereas Belton and Thornton were ar-
rested for drug offenses, Gant was arrested for driving with a sus-
pended license-an offense for which police could not expect to
find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant's car."'42 Law
enforcement officers who make an arrest for a drug offense, then,
can "expect" to find evidence in the passenger compartment of a
vehicle. That expectation satisfies the low reasonable suspicion
threshold, which triggers Gant's evidence preservation rationale.
The citations to Belton and Thornton are instructive. In both
cases, the initial interaction between the law enforcement officer
and the arrestee was premised on a traffic stop-for speeding in
Belton and for displaying the wrong license plate in Thornton-
while the ultimate arrest was for a drug offense.' 3 The majority's
use of Thornton as an example of a search justified by the Gant ra-
tionales is persuasive evidence of Gant's limited effect. In Thorn-
ton, a municipal officer's suspicions were aroused when Thornton
slowed down to avoid driving next to the unmarked police car. '"
The officer conducted a records check and discovered that the li-
cense plate displayed on Thornton's vehicle was not assigned to
that vehicle.'45 Thornton drove into a parking lot, parked, and ex-
ited his vehicle before the officer had an opportunity to initiate a
traffic stop.'46 The officer followed, "parked the patrol car, accosted
[Thornton], and asked him for his driver's license" and whether he
had any weapons or narcotics "on him or in his vehicle," which
Thornton denied.'47 During the course of their interaction, the offi-
cer became "[c]oncerned for his safety" and "asked [Thornton] if
he could pat him down, to which [Thornton] agreed."'48 After feel-
141 Id.
142 Id.
14'New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455-456 (1981); Thornton v. United States,
541 U.S. 615, 618 (2004).
'4 541 U.S. at 617.





ing a "bulge" in Thornton's left front pocket, the officer again
asked Thornton if he had any illegal narcotics on him, and this time
Thornton confessed that he did, reaching into his pockets and
handing the officer three bags of marijuana and a "large amount of
crack cocaine."'' 9 After physically arresting Thornton and securing
him in his patrol car, the officer conducted a search incident to ar-
rest of Thornton's vehicle and discovered a firearm.
In short, Thornton demonstrates all of the characteristics that
make commentators cringe. The traffic stop was pretextual. The in-
teraction between the officer and the arrestee began away from the
vehicle. To the extent the frisk was based on Thornton's consent,
that consent was questionable.' Thornton was compliant through-
out the interaction and, after being asked twice, not only admitted
to drug possession but also voluntarily produced the drugs and
handed them to the officer. Yet the Gant majority cited Thornton
as an example of the proposition that, for some offenses, the very
fact of arrest will justify a vehicle search incident to arrest.
That lower courts have adopted this interpretation of Gant'
blunts any constraining effect that Gant might have had on vehicle
searches incident to arrest. Drug arrests are the single largest cate-
gory tracked by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform
Crime Reports, constituting 12.2% of all arrests.' Although em-
pirical data regarding the nature of arrests from vehicles do not ex-
ist, it is reasonable to expect that vehicle occupants are arrested for
drug crimes far more frequently than for other crimes, largely be-
cause it is simply easier for officers to develop probable cause for
drug crimes in a vehicle than in other situations; officers benefit
149 Id.
"'The Supreme Court did not identify whether this "pat down" was a limited con-
sent search or a Terry frisk, but to the extent that the search was consensual, there is
no discussion regarding the validity of Thornton's consent.
,' See, e.g., United States v. Shakur, 394 F. App'x 974, 976 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding
that a vehicle search incident to arrest for a drug offense was justified under Gant);
United States v. Hayden, 389 F. App'x 544, 549 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Gant and hold-
ing that an "arrest for possession of the marijuana supported a search of the car for
evidence relevant to that offense").
52 U.S. Dep't. of Justice, supra note 1. Numerically, there were more arrests for "All
other offenses" and "Property crimes" than for "Drug abuse violations," but both of
the former are compilations of several different crimes, not independent offenses. Id.
at n.2.
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from being able to approach the car and examine the vehicle and
its occupants at close range.153
In the context of drug offenses, Gant not only does nothing to
restrict vehicle searches incident to arrest, but it also does very lit-
tle to reduce the incentives for traffic-related arrests. Gant's evi-
dentiary rationale holds regardless of how the arresting officer de-
veloped probable cause to make an arrest; if an officer arrests a
vehicle occupant for any reason and discovers drugs during a
search of the person incident to arrest, the officer may charge the
arrestee with the drug offense in addition to (or instead of) the
charge for the original offense. At this point, Gant explicitly au-
thorizes the officer to conduct a vehicle search incident to the drug
arrest.
Drug crimes are not the only offenses for which an arrest estab-
lishes reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains additional evi-
dence. Courts may hold that any possession crime"' satisfies the
reasonable suspicion standard. Consider United States v. Vinton, in
which an officer pulled a vehicle over for speeding and for having
excessively dark window tint.' During the stop, the officer ob-
served a sheathed knife laying on the backseat. "6 The officer
searched the vehicle for weapons pursuant to Michigan v. Long
and discovered a locked briefcase on the backseat and several
other weapons, including a butterfly knife under the front passen-
ger-side floor mat.'57 The officer arrested the driver for possession
of the butterfly knife (a prohibited weapon) and, during a vehicle
1"3 Both the author's experience as a law enforcement officer and conversations with
current officers suggest a rough estimate of thirty to forty percent, with the caveat
that this will vary by jurisdiction, agency, and individual officer. All of the officers be-
lieved that more than twelve percent of their arrests of vehicle occupants include
charges for drug offenses.
" See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-94 (2001) (criminalizing possession of burglary
tools); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-105.2 (2001) (criminalizing possession of devices in-
tended to defeat electronic shoplifting detection devices); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308.2
(2001) (criminalizing possession of firearms by convicted felons); Va. Code Ann.
§ 18.2-308.8 (2001) (criminalizing possession of a certain type of shotgun); Va. Code
Ann. § 18.2-371.2 (2001) (criminalizing underage possession of tobacco products); Va.
Code Ann. § 29.1-550(iii) (2001) (criminalizing possession of wild bird, animal, or fish
in excess of the daily bag or creel limit).
"' 594 F.3d 14, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
156 Id.
,' Id. at 19.
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search incident to arrest, "pried open the locked briefcase" and dis-
covered drugs and additional weapons, including a firearm.'58
In upholding the constitutionality of the search of the locked
briefcase, the D.C. Circuit compared the nature of the arrest in
Vinton to the nature of the arrest in both Belton and Thornton,
finding that unlawful possession of a weapon "resembles narcotics-
possession offenses far more closely than it resembles a traffic vio-
lation. 1 59 The court was unable to "imagine a principled basis for
distinguishing the possession of narcotics from the possession of an
unlawful weapon," noting that the officer testified that "generally
if one weapon is there.., there's the chance that other weapons
could be there."'" Although the D.C. Circuit held that the facts of
the case established that it was reasonable for the officer to "ex-
pect[]" the presence of additional weapons in the vehicle,' it
would have been more accurate to write that, after Gant, the nature
of the offense-a possession crime-established reasonable suspi-
cion that additional evidence of the crime of arrest would be lo-
cated in the vehicle.
Similarly, in United States v. Bunton, an officer stopped and ar-
rested Gary Bunton for driving on a suspended license and, while
searching him incident to arrest, discovered an empty holster and
two bullets.'62 Although the court claimed that the subsequent ve-
hicle search was based on probable cause, the court's language is
pertinent:
[The search of the arrestee's person incident to arrest], as already
discussed, revealed an empty holster and 2 rounds of ammuni-
tion. The ammunition in his pocket constituted a felony violation
of federal and state law. Additionally, it was reasonable to be-
lieve that the empty holster once contained a handgun, and that
the handgun more likely than not was somewhere in the passen-
ger compartment of the vehicle.'63
158 Id.
... Id. at 25-26.
0Id. at 26. For a discussion of the "plus one" rule, see infra text accompanying note
221.
16 594 F.3d at 26 (emphasis added).
'62No. 2:09-CR-106, 2010 WL 2081961, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2010).
'63 Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
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Whether the proposition that the presence of one weapon is in-
dicative of the presence of a second is empirically sound remains
an open question, but, as Part III discusses at more length, law en-
forcement officers are trained to ensure their safety to the greatest
extent possible by assuming such is the case." Police officers also
assume an arrestee's vehicle contains paraphernalia inculpatory of
the possession charge (beyond that found on the arrestee's person)
until they have assured themselves otherwise with a thorough
search. Judicial deference to law enforcement "training and ex-
perience" suggests that, like the D.C. Circuit,65 courts will treat
that assumption as the functional equivalent of reasonable suspi-
cion.
Like drug offenses and possession crimes, arrests for driving un-
der the influence ("DUI") also support reasonable suspicion with-
out facts beyond the nature of the offense. In 2009, arrests for DUI
made up the second largest category of arrests (after drug of-
fenses), with DUI arrests making up more than one out of every
ten arrests," and it is safe to assume that the vast majority of indi-
viduals arrested for DUI were in a vehicle immediately before
their arrest.' While DUI laws do not criminalize the possession of
alcoholic beverages or drugs in a vehicle, 1" the presence of alco-
holic beverage containers or drug paraphernalia is inculpatory.
Substance-impaired drivers may have consumed alcoholic bever-
ages or used drugs in or around their vehicles before they were ar-
6See infra text accompanying note 221.
Vinton, 594 F.3d at 26 (quoting the officer as saying during a suppression hearing,
"generally if one weapon is there.. . there's the chance that other weapons could be
there").
16 U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 1 (reporting arrests under the category of "Driv-
ing under the influence" made up 1,440,409 of a total 13,591,832 arrests, or 10.6%, ex-
cluding arrests for "Runaways" and "Suspicion").
167 Although possible, arresting individuals other than recent vehicle occupants for
DUI often presents evidentiary challenges; officers may be unable to develop prob-
able cause for DUI if the individual had an opportunity to consume alcohol after exit-
ing the vehicle.
'. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266 (2005). This Note includes both driving under




rested, '69 and that evidence of their consumption is relevant to the
DUI charge.
In short, individuals arrested for drug offenses, possession
crimes, and DUI should expect Gant to permit, not restrict, vehicle
searches incident to arrest because these common arrests auto-
matically trigger Gant's evidentiary justification.7'
b. Factual Scenarios Supporting the Reasonable Suspicion
Presumption
The offenses presented in the preceding section-those for
which the fact of arrest establishes reasonable suspicion that evi-
dence of the crime of arrest can be found within the vehicle-are
largely incidental to a traffic stop. In other words, law enforcement
officers develop probable cause to make an arrest by interacting
with the driver only after initiating the traffic stop. However, law
enforcement officers also initiate traffic stops because they have
probable cause to arrest a vehicle occupant or reasonable suspicion
that justifies an investigatory detention (which then leads to arrest)
for something other than a traffic offense.
169 Although empirical evidence is elusive, the author's experience as a police officer
suggests that consumption of alcohol while tailgating at a sporting event is common,
as is drinking or using drugs in the parking lot of a nightclub or bar before entering or
after leaving the establishment.
70 Notably, Gant may result in more protection for white arrestees than minority
arrestees since minorities are arrested at a disproportionately high rate for the of-
fenses that automatically satisfy Gant. Census estimates for 2009 indicate that 12.86%
of individuals in the United States are classified as at least partially "Black," but ar-
rest statistics from 2009 reflect that 41% of all persons arrested for weapons of-
fenses-a possession crime-and 33.6% of all persons arrested for drug offenses were
categorized as "Black." U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Resident Popu-
lation by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1,
2009 (2010), http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2009-srh.html; U.S.
Census Bureau, Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000
(2001), http://censtats.census.gov/data/US/01000.pdf; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fed. Bu-
reau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2009, Table 43: Arrests by Race
(2010), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_43.html. Although individuals ar-
rested for DUI are disproportionately white (making up 86.3% of DUI arrestees
compared to an estimated 81.1% of the population), white individuals are not nearly
as overrepresented in DUI arrests as black individuals are in weapons and drug ar-
rests. Id. Thus, Gant restricts vehicle searches incident to arrest for crimes for which
whites are more likely to be arrested (except DUI) but permits such searches for
crimes for which minorities are more likely to be arrested.
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Officers can initiate traffic stops when they reasonably suspect
that a vehicle was involved in a crime, particularly a recently com-
mitted crime. If the officer arrests a vehicle occupant for that
crime, the fact that the arrest occurred shortly after the crime was
committed establishes reasonable suspicion that there is evidence
of the crime of arrest in the vehicle. Similarly, the commission of a
crime in a vehicle will establish at least reasonable suspicion, even
if it is not a crime for which the arrest itself would justify reason-
able suspicion. In other words, it is not the nature of the crime of
arrest that justifies an officer's reasonable suspicion but rather the
circumstances surrounding the arrest.17'
Officers develop probable cause for some number of traffic
stops-there are no data available on precisely how many-based
on information contained in Be on the Lookout ("BOLO") notices
or All-Points Bulletins ("APBs"). In a typical scenario, a BOLO or
APB serves to alert officers that a vehicle of a certain description
was involved in a crime or traffic offense. Supreme Court prece-
dent allows law enforcement officers to conduct an investigatory
stop based solely on a notice issued "on the basis of articulable
facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has
committed an offense."'72 If an officer then arrests a vehicle occu-
pant for a recently committed crime, the temporal proximity of the
crime to the arrest supports at least reasonable suspicion, if not
probable cause, that evidence of the crime of arrest is located
within the vehicle.
In United States v. Walker, a radioed BOLO notice alerted offi-
cers of a recent bank robbery and provided the description of the
armed bank robber and the getaway vehicle.'73 About thirty min-
utes after the robbery, an officer encountered the vehicle parked at
a body shop. Walker, who matched the radioed description of the
suspect, was outside of the vehicle carrying a duffel bag." After
calling for backup, the officer approached Walker and, in the
course of their interaction and without Walker's consent, searched
171 The notable exceptions, of course, are offenses of a nature that preclude the as-
sertion of reasonable suspicion, such as traffic infractions.
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985).





the duffel bag and found evidence of the robbery.' 5 In upholding
the legality of the search of the duffel bag, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit held that,
[b]ased on the description of the robbery in the BOLO, including
the warning that the thief was armed, Walker's statement that he
was driving the car that matched the license plate of the robber's
car and his response to the request for identification,
the officers had a "perfectly reasonable apprehension" that
Walker had a weapon in the duffel bag that he was carrying.'76
Although the arrestee in Walker was not a recent vehicle occu-
pant, the Sixth Circuit's logic extends to such situations. If the ar-
resting officer had observed a vehicle matching the description, ini-
tiated a traffic stop, and arrested the driver, the court seems
inevitably positioned to hold that the officer had a "perfectly rea-
sonable apprehension" that evidence of the robbery would be in
the vehicle.
In Lavender v. City of Blue Ash, a Section 1983 action for viola-
tions of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments related to a war-
rantless vehicle search, the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's
grant of summary judgment for defendant officers who had
stopped a vehicle that matched the APB description of a getaway
car used in an armed robbery that occurred about forty-five min-
utes before the stop.'77 The getaway vehicle was described as a
"boxy, older police cruiser type vehicle, color white [sic] with an
unusual driver's side spotlight common to police cars
and... contain[ing] two occupants.' '7. The officers detained the
driver, an African-American woman, and her two daughters, aged
ten and sixteen, and conducted a search of the vehicle for the bank
robber, described as a white male in his thirties.9 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit, holding:
17 I d .
176 Id. at 731-32. Officers later obtained a warrant to search the rest of the duffel bag
and located additional evidence of the robbery, including dark clothing, money from
the bank, and a firearm. Id. at 730-31.
'-n162 F. App'x 548, 548-49 (6th Cir. 2006).
,T Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
179 Id. at 549. The APB did not describe the driver of the getaway vehicle.
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[Tihere was no constitutional violation because the initial stop,
viewed in light of all the circumstances, was supported
by... reasonable suspicion ... and because the officers who de-
tained the plaintiff had a reasonable belief that an armed robber
might have been in the car, thereby justifying both the level of
force used by the officers to secure the scene and the thorough-
ness of their search. 18°
Modifying the facts only slightly, one is faced with the almost in-
evitable conclusion that, in a similar situation, Gant would not re-
strict an officer's ability to conduct a vehicle search incident to ar-
rest because the facts of the situation-the matching descriptions
and the relatively short period of time that passed between the
commission of the crime and the arrest-establish reasonable sus-
picion that evidence of the crime of arrest is located in the vehicle.
Consider what would have occurred if the officers had arrested the
driver of the vehicle for the robbery. The court would likely have
found that the officers possessed at least reasonable suspicion that
the vehicle contained evidence of the robbery, which would have
justified the vehicle search incident to arrest under Gant. Thus, in a
number of common factual scenarios, Gant functions identically to
Belton by permitting law enforcement officers to conduct vehicle
searches incident to arrest.
Courts may also be expected to permit vehicle searches incident
to arrest in accordance with Gant when the vehicle plays some in-
dependent role in the offense. In other words, courts will hold that
officers have at least reasonable suspicion that evidence of the
crime of arrest is located within a vehicle when a vehicle itself is a
crime scene, 8 ' when the vehicle was an instrumentality of the crime
and so is itself evidence," or when the vehicle was used in conjunc-
tion with the crime.
1 83
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Here, as before, Gant will have no effect. If an officer has reasonable suspicion,
which this Note argues is inevitable in these situations, Gant will permit a vehicle
search incident to arrest. If an officer has probable cause, Gant is inapplicable because
the search is no longer incident to arrest.
18 Consider an assault in which the vehicle is used as the weapon and evidence of
the driver's identity may be located within.
1' An example would be when officers believe the vehicle to be a getaway vehicle
that contains evidence of the underlying crime.
[Vol. 97:17271758
Modern Police Practices
For example, consider United States v. Avery, in which the West-
ern District of Tennessee held that officers had reasonable suspi-
cion to justify an evidentiary search incident to arrest of a vehicle
that was the "common link" between a series of robberies and a
murder that had occurred four days before.'" The court wrote,
"The principal element linking the multiple crimes was the older
model, green Mercury Villager van. Because the van was the com-
mon link to all of the crimes, it was reasonable for the officers to
conclude that the van was likely to contain evidence related to the
robberies."'85 While Avery dealt with a single vehicle implicated in
multiple crimes, such logic strongly suggests that Gant's reasonable
suspicion threshold is satisfied when a vehicle is used in conjunc-
tion with a crime.
3. Officer Safety Searches Incident to Arrest
In addition to evidentiary vehicle searches incident to arrest,
Gant permits vehicle searches incident to arrest when the arrestee
"is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger com-
partment at the time of the search."'"6 Regrettably, the question of
how to determine whether an arrestee is unsecured or within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment of his vehicle at
the time of the search was not before the Supreme Court. In Gant,
the arrestee was not only handcuffed, but secured in the back of a
police car before officers began to search the arrestee's vehicle. 7
Further, there were a total of five officers at the scene at the time,
with three arrestees each handcuffed and secured in separate po-
lice cars.' Yet we do not know which factors, if any, were determi-
native in Gant, or even whether the Supreme Court would favor a
bright-line rule or a totality-of-the-circumstances standard in future
cases.
Courts need not limit "secured" arrestees to those who have
been handcuffed. Instead, courts may interpret "secured" in a way
"' No. 07-20040, 2010 WL 419946, at *2, *6 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2010). The court
further held the search was reasonable under the rationale that the officers had prob-
able cause to search the vehicle independent of the arrest. Id. at *4-5.
8' Id. at *6 (internal citation omitted).
186 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009).




that blunts Gant's effect by defining it as "placed in a police vehicle
or locked room." The Eighth Circuit suggested just such a defini-
tion in United States v. Perdoma, in which two law enforcement of-
ficers arrested an individual in a bus terminal, put him in handcuffs,
and escorted him to the rear of the terminal before they searched
his bag incident to arrest and found 454 grams of methampheta-
mine." The defendant argued for an extension of Gant, claiming
that he was "secured" and not within reaching distance of his bag
when it was searched." While holding that the defendant had
waived his right to challenge the legality of the search of his bag,
the Eighth Circuit noted that Gant does not hold that "an arrestee
who is restrained in some fashion by law enforcement necessarily is
secured.191 The Eighth Circuit opinion in Perdoma sets the stage
for permitting vehicle searches incident to arrest when the arrestee
is handcuffed, so long as the arrestee is not "secured" for purposes
of Gant. If a handcuffed arrestee is not considered secured for the
purposes of Gant until he is placed in the backseat of a police car,
Gant's officer safety exception becomes far broader than it first
appears. District courts have already evidenced the manifold ways
an arrest may be defined as "secured" vel non."
While this Note takes the position that law enforcement officers
will not risk their safety by intentionally leaving an arrestee unse-
cured so as to justify a search incident to arrest, 93 it is not uncom-
mon for officers to delay before putting a handcuffed arrestee into
a police car. Further, whether or not the arrestee is "secured" in a
police car may depend on the size of the police department. As of
September 2004, forty-nine percent of all officers in the United
621 F.3d. 745, 747-48 (8th Cir. 2010).
'90 Id. at 751.
"' Id. at 752.
,9See David S. Chase, Who is Secure?: A Framework for Arizona v. Gant, 78 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 2577, 2603-07 (2010) (discussing the different ways district courts have
determined whether an arrestee is "secured").
,' See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724-25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting officers may
manipulate the Gant holding by leaving suspects unsecured in order to justify vehicle
searches incident to arrest). Justice Scalia may not have considered that law enforce-
ment officers are trained to treat all suspects as dangerous, even those arrested for the
most innocuous of crimes. He also overlooks or underestimates the restrictions on of-
ficers' willingness to disregard their own safety, which are created and reinforced by
formal mechanisms, such as agency policies or procedures, as well as significant in-
formal sanctions that other officers impose on those who fail to mitigate safety risks.
1760 [Vol. 97:1727
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States work for the 385 law enforcement agencies that employ at
least 250 full-time sworn officers,'" and these officers are more
likely to have backup with them when they make an arrest. Police
officers may not secure a handcuffed arrestee in the back of an
available police car when they view him as presenting a minimal
threat either because he has been compliant throughout the arrest
or because there are enough officers on scene to minimize con-
cerns about resistance, or both. One officer may be handcuffing or
interacting with the arrestee at the same time that other officers
search the arrestee's vehicle.195 In short, officers need not manipu-
late the situation to artificially leave an "unsecured" arrestee
within reaching distance of his or her vehicle. Instead, they can
maintain pre-Gant practices without any restriction in their ability
to search a vehicle incident to arrest since Gant imposes no re-
quirement that officers must make every effort-or any effort-to
properly secure an arrestee before conducting a vehicle search in-
cident to arrest.
Gant's restriction of vehicle searches incident to arrest may be
more limited than it appears for small law enforcement agencies as
well. While having multiple officers at the scene of an arrest is a
law enforcement best practice, it is admittedly not feasible for all
agencies. Almost one quarter of all police officers work for agen-
cies with fewer than fifty full-time employees, and just over half of
all state and local law enforcement agencies have fewer than ten
full-time employees.'" Not only are law enforcement officers work-
ing at smaller agencies unlikely to have backup available when
they make an arrest, they are also less likely to be equipped to
handle multiple arrestees. If the arresting officer physically arrests
two or three people, he may not have room to secure them all in
his vehicle, and the presence of an unsecured, but handcuffed, ar-
'94Brian A. Reaves, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement
Agencies 2004, at 2 tbl.2 (2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea04.pdf.
,, See, e.g., Guy calls Cops Nazi's.flv [sic], YouTube,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8RxHlCnYhd8 (last visited July 8, 2011). From
00:05 to 05:05, an officer searches and interacts with a handcuffed woman while an-
other officer searches her vehicle and a third officer observes. While it is unclear
whether the vehicle search was incident to arrest or based on some other justification,
this video illustrates a common practice when multiple officers are on scene.
'" Reaves, supra note 194, at 2 tbl.2.
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restee would likely justify a vehicle search incident to arrest after
Gant.
C. When Will Gant Matter?
In light of Gant's limited impact, one inevitably arrives at the
question: when will Gant actually prohibit vehicle searches incident
to arrest? Gant will restrict law enforcement officers' ability to
conduct vehicle searches incident to arrest for crimes other than
drug offenses, possession crimes, and DUI, so long as the arrest is
not for a recently committed crime and the vehicle itself did not
play some role in the crime beyond being where the arrestee was
located during or immediately before his arrest. Even in this con-
text, however, Gant will still permit vehicle searches incident to ar-
rest if the arresting officer finds, for example, drugs or drug para-
phernalia during a search of the arrestee's person incident to
arrest.
Arrests for outstanding warrants may be the most common rea-
son for an officer to physically arrest a vehicle occupant in a situa-
tion that does not justify a vehicle search incident to arrest after
Gant.'97 Like a traffic infraction, an arrest pursuant to a writ of mit-
timus-a capias or a "cash purge warrant" issued when a defendant
fails to appear for a hearing or fails to pay monies owed to the
court-would not support a vehicle search incident to arrest be-
cause there is simply no possibility for evidence of the crime of ar-
rest to exist in the vehicle. However, whether an outstanding arrest
warrant for other crimes will justify a vehicle search incident to ar-
rest post-Gant is a more complicated issue. Courts may treat an
outstanding arrest warrant the same way that they would treat an
arrest for the underlying crime without a warrant by holding, for
example, that an arrest for an outstanding warrant for a drug crime
justifies a vehicle search incident to arrest based on the nature of
the offense. Alternatively, courts could hold that the warrant proc-
ess itself severs the connection between the underlying crime and
the circumstances of the arrest, effectively precluding a vehicle
search incident to arrest unless officers have reasonable suspicion
independent of the nature of the offense.
"' There are no data available that identify the number of arrests based on warrants
compared to warrantless arrests.
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Gant will have very little effect in situations where commenta-
tors most expected it to apply-common arrests from vehicles-
but it may constrain police in the context of arrests for outstanding
warrants.
III. LAW ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES & THE DIVERGENCE
BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND PRACTICE
Gant was intended to cut back on the Belton precedent and con-
strain law enforcement officers' ability to conduct vehicle searches
incident to arrest. But, as the preceding Part demonstrated, Gant's
constraint is illusory largely because of the Court's failure to con-
sider why and how officers arrest vehicle occupants. The justifica-
tions for searches incident to arrest should be more thoroughly
grounded in an understanding of the realities of law enforcement
practice. For example, officers begin taking precautions to ensure
their safety well before putting an arrestee in handcuffs and often
even before they initiate the encounter. These precautions should
matter to judges and academics, as they are a thus far ignored facet
of the totality-of-the-circumstances test under which so much law
enforcement behavior is reviewed. If the Fourth Amendment truly
calls for the balancing of societal and personal interests, courts de-
termining whether a search is justified by an officer safety rationale
should consider the precautionary measures taken by the officer
before conducting the search. When considered in this light, the
costs of an invasive search may outweigh the marginal benefits.
Courts and commentators typically lack information about police
practices, however, and so the justifications for searches incident to
arrest exist irrespective of, not in light of, law enforcement proce-
dures designed to ensure both that arrestees will be compliant and
that officers can effectively respond to noncompliance throughout
their encounters. This Part seeks to close the informational gap by
describing common law enforcement procedures.
Data about police practices are difficult to come by. In the lone
attempt at an "empirical" study of arrest and search procedures to
be published in a legal journal, Professor Moskovitz noted with
some vexation that law enforcement agencies are often less than
forthcoming about what exactly they train their officers to do.98
" Moskovitz, supra note 18, at 662-63.
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This Part draws from information in police procedure texts, train-
ing or policy manuals, and articles intended for a law enforcement
audience, as well as information and training obtained by the au-
thor during almost five years of experience as a patrol officer in a
large municipal police department."
A search incident to arrest is only one in a series of distinct steps
that are designed to maximize safety by ensuring that an officer es-
tablishes and maintains effective control over an arrestee. The re-
mainder of this Part provides more detailed information about the
other steps in that series, as well as common law enforcement
search procedures, in order to highlight the disparity between how
judges and academics perceive arrests and searches and how law
enforcement officers conduct them. With a better understanding of
what police do and why they do it, courts will be better able to as-
sure their opinions have the intended effect.
A. Descriptive Analysis: Arrests
Arrests are not spontaneous events. An arresting officer is under
no obligation to reach for his handcuffs immediately after deter-
mining that probable cause exists and an arrest is appropriate. In-
stead, officers approach physical arrests strategically, choosing
where the arrest is to be conducted and, to the extent possible,
maximizing the tactical advantages of the situation. For example,
officers routinely ask individuals whom they intend to arrest to
move to a neutral or officer-controlled area. Thus, they move a
suspected shoplifter from the aisles of a department store to a se-
curity office, persuade a domestic battery suspect to leave his
house and stand in the yard, and ask an apparently impaired driver
to step away from his vehicle in a parking lot.2"
'"The Tallahassee Police Department has over 350 sworn officers and patrols an
area of approximately 100 square miles. See Chief of Police, City of Tallahassee,
http://www.talgov.com/tpd/chief.cfm (last visited May 18, 2011). Only about two per-
cent of local and state law enforcement agencies have 250 or more sworn officers.
Reaves, supra note 194, at 2 tbl.2.
"0 The emphasis on tactical safety and establishing control of a scene is pervasive in
law enforcement. For example, officers control where they initiate traffic stops by de-
laying the activation of their emergency lights, seek the least obtrusive possible re-
sponse to a 911 call by parking down the street from the target address and walking
the rest of the distance, and position themselves in a certain way when two officers
are speaking with a civilian. A number of police departments prefer officers to delay
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After determining that a particular location is appropriate, the
officer informs the arrestee that he is under arrest. This serves two
purposes. First, without clear disclosure of the fact of arrest, an in-
dividual who flees or resists may avoid being charged for his resis-
tance. 1 Second, because informing the arrestee takes a few mo-
ments, the officer gains the opportunity to gauge the arrestee's
compliance. Police officers monitor the arrestee before and
throughout the arrest process for behavior that suggests that physi-
cal coercion may become necessary. 2° This permits officers to be
maximally responsive to resistance. Officers are taught to remain
hyper-vigilant to indications of pending resistance: to a police offi-
cer, even the completely compliant individuals who represent the
vast majority of arrestees present a threat."3
After informing the arrestee that he is under arrest, the officer
commands him to face away-so he cannot watch the officer-and
making an arrest until multiple officers are present. For additional information about
officers' tactical considerations, see generally Jonathan Rubenstein, Controlling Peo-
ple, in Policing: A View from the Street 255-65 (Peter K. Manning & John Van
Maanen eds., 1978).
Although it seems possible for officers to manipulate the location of the arrest to
maximize the benefit of a search of the "grabbing area" incident to arrest, this Note
takes the position that a well-trained officer will prioritize his or her safety over more
general law enforcement interests, including where to search.
20 This is particularly true in states that limit the criminalization of resistance to
situations involving arrests, as opposed to statutory regimes that criminalize the fail-
ure to obey lawful orders that need not involve an arrest. Compare N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:29-2 (West 2005) (criminalizing preventing or attempting to prevent a law en-
forcement officer from effecting an arrest), with Fla. Stat. §§ 843.01-02 (2010) (crimi-
nalizing resistance, obstruction, and opposition to "the lawful execution of any legal
dut/' without limiting it to the act of arrest).
See Scott D. Burns, Focus on Officer Safety: Surviving Hostile Encounters, 75-3
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 10 (2006), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2006-pdfs/marO6leb.pdf ("Frequently,
suspects exhibit body language indicators that can alert officers to pending violent
behavior. Some of these can include nervousness, profuse sweating, shaking, muscle
rigidity, dryness around the mouth or lips, and rapid speech. Subjects may look
around for an escape route, try to place their hands in their pockets, or pay attention
to verbal signals from their companions.").
" See, e.g., George Demetriou, Be Mindful of the Handcuff "Rip" Tactic by Vio-
lent Offenders, PoliceOne.com (May 1, 2009), http://www.policeone.com/police-
products/duty-gear/restraints/artices/1816808-Be-mindful-of-the-handcuff-rip-tactic-
by-violent-offenders/ ("All suspects, their family members and their friends are dan-
gerous.... All suspects are armed until you know positively that they are not.").
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place his hands behind his back.2' The arresting officer keeps his
own hands free during this phase of the arrest; that is, the officer
does not yet have a pair of handcuffs in hand. If the arrestee com-
plies, the officer moves in from behind the arrestee and "tests the
waters" by lightly touching the arrestee on the back or shoulder
with one hand.0 5 If the arrestee remains compliant, the officer will
establish control over the arrestee's hands, for example, by sliding
his "testing" hand down the arrestee's arm and grabbing both of
the arrestee's thumbs. Only if the arrestee continues to remain
compliant will a well-trained officer then use his free hand to re-
move his handcuffs from a belt pouch or handcuff holster and ap-
ply them to the arrestee's wrists. Officers are trained to be particu-
larly wary during the actual application of handcuffs. Not only is an
officer's attention drawn momentarily away from the arrestee's
behavior to the mechanics required to apply the handcuffs, but the
handcuffs themselves are a potential weapon that the arrestee
could use against the officer.2" In the event that an initially compli-
ant arrestee resists at some point, officers are trained to forsake
any attempt to wrestle the arrestee into handcuffs. Instead, they
204 Variations exist, such as requiring the arrestee to kneel, cross one foot over the
other, and place his hands on his head. Regardless of the exact instruction, the princi-
palpurpose is to put the arrestee in a disadvantageous physical position.
20 The rationale for this action is based on gauging the suspect's "fight or flight" re-
sponse on the understanding that some arrestees will begin to resist only after the of-
ficer makes physical contact with them or after handcuffs are partially applied. See,
e.g., McCullough v. Quarterman, No. H-06-3974, 2008 WL 5061512, at *7 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 24, 2008) (noting that inmate who was being handcuffed began physically resist-
ing after one handcuff had been applied). By making physical contact with the ar-
restee before retrieving the handcuffs, the officer is prepared to respond to resistance
without having to first secure his handcuffs or put them beyond the reach of the com-
bative arrestee.
206 There have been many instances of an arrestee's use of handcuffs to attack or
threaten the arresting officer. See Parker v. Gerrish, 547 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2008);
United States v. Steptoe, 126 F. App'x 47, 49 (3d Cir. 2005); Cooper v. Rakers,
No. 09-556-GPM, 2010 WL 1241530, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2010); McCullough, 2008
WL 5061512 at *7; Poole v. Gee, No. 8:07-CV-912-EAJ, 2008 WL 3367548, at "8-'10
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2008); Owens v. Chrisman, No. 3:07-0021, 2008 WL 217118, at *8
(M.D. Tenn. Jan. 23, 2008); Parker v. City of S. Portland, No. 06-129-P-S, 2007 WL
1468658, at *11 n.50 (D. Me. May 18, 2007); Riddle v. Baber, No. 2:05CV00031, 2005
WL 2605545, at *2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2005); Birdine v. Gray, 375 F. Supp. 2d 874, 876
n.2 (D. Neb. July 5, 2005).
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are instructed to subdue the arrestee to a point where handcuffs
can be applied with minimal effort.2'
Properly applied, handcuffs hold the arrestee's arms behind his
back with the backs of the arrestee's hands facing each other.Y
Law enforcement training emphasizes that threats originate from
the hands-hands can wield a weapon or be used themselves as
weapons.' Behind-the-back handcuffing minimizes the arrestee's
range of motion, reducing the threat posed by a secured arrestee
by limiting his ability to grab or use a weapon or throw a punch.21
B. Descriptive Analysis: Searches
A search of the arrestee's person incident to arrest does not have
to be conducted immediately after the arrest."' If an officer is un-
able to make the arrest in an ideal location, it is common for him to
remove the arrestee from the place of arrest and relocate to an of-
ficer-controlled area before conducting a search of the arrestee's
person."2 An officer thoroughly searches arrestees before placing
2 Charles Remsberg, The Tactical Edge: Surviving High-Risk Patrol 487 (1986) ("If
[a suspect] is still fighting and is not stabilized, you should not be attempting to hand-
cuff him .... It's control first, then handcuffing.") (emphasis omitted); Demetriou,
supra note 203.
Remsberg, supra note 207, at 498-506 ("Remember: EVERY arrestee should be
handcuffed with hands behind him-and stay handcuffed-regardless of how coop-
erative he appears to be."); Portland Police Bureau, Manual of Policy and Procedure
§ 870.20 (2009); John Wills, Officer... It Hurts, LawOfficer.com (Apr. 30, 2008),
http://www.lawofficer.com/article/needs-tags-columns/officerit-hurts ("It is not tacti-
cally sound to cuff someone in the front."). Law enforcement agencies typically have
policies that allow arrestees to be handcuffed with their hands in front of them only in
exceptional circumstances, such as for arrestees with certain medical conditions.
0 See Lawrence Mower & Brian Hayes, LV Officer at Costco Recorded in 911
Call, Las Vegas Review-Journal, July 14, 2010, at 1A (citing an expert witness for the
proposition that "[o]fficers are trained to look for threats, and in particular, a sus-
pect's hands").
2,' Officers may apply additional restraints to arrestees who remain combative after
being handcuffed, such as four-point restraints or hobbles that prevent the arrestee
from freely moving his arms or legs. See, e.g., Portland Police Bureau, supra note 208,
§ 870.20 ("Members are authorized to use hobble restraint cords when necessary to
subdue or secure a violent or unruly person. Restraint cords should not be used in lieu
of handcuffs.").
211 United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 (1974).
212 "Relocate" is used here to mean walking a short distance, such as out of a house
into the front yard or from inside of or behind a store to the parking lot. It does not
refer to transporting an arrestee in a police vehicle; absent exceptional circumstances,
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them in a police vehicle, and additional person-searches are typi-
cally conducted by every officer who takes custody of the arrestee.
An arrestee who is placed in handcuffs, put in the arresting offi-
cer's police car, and then moved to a transport unit and brought to
the police department for questioning, before finally being taken to
jail or a booking facility, can expect no less than four searches: one
at the scene of the arrest, another when the transport officer takes
custody, a third when the transport officer turns the arrestee over
to the questioning officer, and a fourth when the questioning offi-
cer turns him back over to a transport officer.213
The nature of a search of the arrestee incident to arrest is such
that police do not know what they are looking for-the search is in-
tended to locate everything from large weapons to items as small as
a handcuff key or single piece of crack cocaine the size of a small
raisin and weighing just one-tenth of a gram."' By design, there-
fore, searches incident to arrest are both thorough and invasive. A
widely circulated law enforcement text first published in 1980 in-
structs officers to search a person this way:
Your search should be systematic, so you cover [the arrestee's]
entire body from his head to his toes. A good place to look first is
around the suspect's midriff....
After checking the waist area, go to the top of his head and
check all areas down to his toes. Work from top to bottom, right
to left-and maintain the same search system on each suspect.
That way you won't forget any area.
No area of the body or item of clothing should be immune
from searching. Adversaries have been known to carry guns in
the crotch of their pants... inside their hats.., up their
arrestees are always (or should always be) searched before they are placed into a po-
lice vehicle and transported.
213 These policies are intended to reduce the potential that the arrestee will retain
possession of weapons or evidence. The consequences of such an oversight were dra-
matically demonstrated in 2003 by Ricardo Alfonso Cerna, who shot and killed him-
self in a police interrogation room using a concealed handgun that officers failed to
locate when he was arrested and transported to the police department. Lance Pug-
mire, Deputy Shooting Suspect Kills Himself at Station, L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 2003, at
B1. The suicide was captured on video, which is widely available on the internet.
"' See U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., Drug Trafficking in the United States, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/dea/concern/drug-trafficking.html (last visited
May 18, 2011).
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sleeves.., on cords around their necks.., under coats and
vests.., or fastened to their arms or legs by rubber bands or
tape. Sometimes, they hide them in slings and ban-
dages.... Others have carried guns taped in their arm pits or un-
der their breasts.
A favorite spot for concealing weapons, often overlooked, is
inside boots....
Male officers (and female officers, too, for that matter) are of-
ten reluctant to search a male suspect's crotch area....
Similarly, male officers may be hesitant about searching fe-
male prisoners on the street .... In searching a female, first pull
out her blouse tail if it's tucked in; sometimes guns or other
weapons will fall out. Also consider unsnapping her bra and
shaking it by its straps .... In checking between and under her
breasts, on the insides of her thighs and around her crotch, use
the edge of your hand. This can protect you against accusations
of improper advances.215
Clothing, personal belongings, and containers in the arrestee's pos-
session can also be thoroughly searched-potentially including
electronic devices.216
Law enforcement officers are trained to secure the occupants of
a vehicle before searching the vehicle.1 7 If the occupants are ar-
restees, they may be handcuffed, subjected to a search of their per-
sons, and secured in a police car. If the occupants are not being ar-
rested, officers may ask them to step out of the vehicle and then
secure them to the extent possible, which usually involves decreas-
ing their mobility by having them sit on a nearby sidewalk. 8 Ide-
ally, there will be multiple officers on scene-at least one to watch
the vehicle occupants while another searches the vehicle.
215 Ronald J. Adams et al., Street Survival: Tactics for Armed Encounters 260-63
(1997) (discussing specifically searches for weapons but applicable to all person
searches).
216 See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007) (cell phone);
United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (pager).
17 Remsberg, supra note 207, at 294 (providing the emphatic instruction, "NEVER
TRY TO SEARCH AN OCCUPIED VEHICLE").
218 Id. at 295.
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As with a search of the person, a vehicle search incident to arrest
is intended to locate weapons and other contraband. In the vehicle
context, this involves checking
the glove box ... armrests. .. door panels ... the sides of the
seats next to the doors ... under the seats, including in the
springs... inside torn upholstery... inside heater and air condi-
tioning vents, especially if loose.., under headrests... on the
shelf-like lip under the instrument panel... in ash trays and litter
bags... under floor mats... behind or in center arm
rests.., behind visors ... inside the gasoline cap ... under the
spare tire, etc.
21 9
Law enforcement training emphasizes two precepts: First, even
an apparently innocent item can conceal a weapon or have a con-
cealed compartment that may contain contraband.22 Second, offi-
cers are trained to apply what is known as the "plus one rule,"
meaning that officers should never assume that they have found all
the weapons or contraband on a person or in any given area.
Rather, no matter what they have found, officers should always as-
... Id. at 296 (ellipses in original) (discussing these areas primarily as locations where
weapons may be hidden but mentioning the frequency with which contraband may be
hidden there as well). In other contexts, such as arrests that occur in a house or busi-
ness, officers can conduct an exhaustive search of the grabbing area. Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). This may include inside desk drawers, underneath
furniture, between couch cushions, behind and inside books, within trashcans, and
within nearby closets so long as they are near where the arrest occurred.
2°See, e.g., Wendy Kierstead, Officer Safety Handbook of Unusual Weapons
Along with Concealment Methods for Weapons and/or Contraband (3d ed. 2004)
(providing information about and photographs of camouflaged firearms, camouflaged
bladed weapons, hidden or concealed compartments or diversion safes, camouflaged
explosive devices, and miscellaneous items of interest to police, such as camouflaged
handcuff keys and a ring that emits pepper spray). Perhaps the most notorious use of
a diversion safe, which protects its contents by disguising itself as an innocent item
rather than by being difficult to gain access to, arose in 2007, when football player Mi-
chael Vick was detained in Miami International Airport for having a water bottle with
a hidden compartment that was originally thought to contain marijuana. See Michael
Vick's Water Bottle Raises Suspicion at Miami Airport, USA Today (Jan. 19, 2007),
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/falcons/2007-01-18-vick-water-
bottle-x.htm).
221 Robert Stering, Police Officer's Handbook: An Introductory Guide 90 (2005)
("When conducting a search on a person, always consider the 'plus-one rule.' If one
weapon is found, you should assume that the suspect has two weapons. If two weap-
ons are found, you should assume that there are three, and so on.").
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sume that there is more to find. These two precepts motivate law
enforcement officers to handle and examine innocent items in their
effort to perform a meticulous search, which may appear far more
invasive than what is warranted by the circumstances.
An analysis of police search and arrest procedures makes clear
that the traditional focus, which determines the validity of a search
by considering the situation as it existed at the time of the search, is
incomplete. How police approached the scene, controlled the loca-
tion, interacted with individuals, and secured the arrestee are all
important factors in a proper Fourth Amendment balancing in-
quiry.
CONCLUSION
Academic literature has taken Gant's purported restriction of
vehicle searches incident to arrest for granted. Commentators have
focused on the prevalence of alternative justifications for war-
rantless searches,222 the effect Gant will have on non-vehicle
searches incident to arrest,223 or questions about Gant's implemen-
tation.224 Yet the core assumption-that Gant will substantially
limit law enforcement officers' ability to search vehicles incident to
arrest-is mistaken. Gant will not significantly reduce vehicle
searches incident to arrest because both the evidence preservation
and officer safety justifications are far more permissive than they
first appear.
Although Gant will prevent vehicle searches incident to arrests
for traffic violations, the rarity of such arrests prevents Gant from
22 See sources cited supra note 15.
223 See Armacost, supra note 15, at 311-12; Colin Miller, Stranger Than Dictum:
Why Arizona v. Gant Compels the Conclusion that Suspicionless Buie Searches Inci-
dent to Lawful Arrests Are Unconstitutional, 62 Baylor L. Rev. 1 (2010); Myron
Moskovitz, The James Otis Lecture: The Road to Reason: Arizona v. Gant and the
Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine, 79 Miss. L.J. 181, 199-201 (2009); Singh, supra
note 95, at 1776-93.
... For example, commentators have asked whether the good faith doctrine applies
to evidence seized in violation of Gant. See, e.g., Zachary C. Larsen, A Narrow Ex-
tension of "Good Faith" to Police Reliance on Settled Case Law: The Crossroads of
Gant and Herring, 27 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 249, 253-58 (2010); see also Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 17-18, United States v. Gonzalez, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011) (No. 10-
82), 2010 WL 2786992 (describing a split on this question between the Ninth Circuit




doing much work in this context. Vehicle occupants are most
commonly arrested for drug offenses, possession crimes, and DUI-
-crimes for which the mere fact of arrest serves to justify a vehicle
search incident to arrest under Gant's evidentiary rationale. And
even when the arrest does not give officers reasonable suspicion
that evidence of the crime of arrest is located in the vehicle, factual
circumstances common to many arrests will often provide such rea-
sonable suspicion, particularly with arrests for recently committed
crimes and those in which the vehicle played some role. Finally, in
cases where neither the nature of the offense nor the factual cir-
cumstances surrounding the arrest provides reasonable suspicion,
Gant's effect is blunted by law enforcement's continued ability to
conduct a search of the arrestee's person and the possibility of dis-
covering drugs, paraphernalia, or other contraband, an arrest for
any of which would then justify a vehicle search incident to arrest.
Like the evidentiary holding, the officer safety holding in Gant is
far more permissive than it first appears. Officers at larger police
departments, which have enough personnel to have multiple offi-
cers at the scene of an arrest, may be able to search the arrestee's
vehicle while the arrestee is handcuffed but not secured in the back
of a police car. Officers at smaller departments, who typically make
arrests without backup, may be able to conduct vehicle searches in-
cident to arrest when there are more arrestees than can be put in a
single police car.
Whether a vehicle search incident to arrest is reasonable de-
pends in part on the environment in which it occurs, but courts and
commentators lack detailed information about that environment.
That lacuna leads to holdings that are predicated on speculation,
such as the Supreme Court's establishment of an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that the passenger compartment of a vehicle is always
within an arrestee's grabbing range.225 By providing a more detailed
description of the process by which officers create the environment
in which they make arrests and conduct searches, this Note seeks
to promote academic and judicial consideration of factors critical
to both precisely defining those two events-ubiquitous in the con-
text of law enforcement-and to assuring that changes to policy
and governing law have the desired effect. Using Gant and the
' New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981).
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search incident to arrest doctrine as an example, this Note suggests
that the traditional determination of what constitutes a reasonable
search is incomplete: to properly balance Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy interests against the essential need for officer safety, judges
and academics must realign their perspectives on police to take
modern police procedures into account.
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